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I. INTRODUCTION: RACIAL PREFERENCE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
While the concept of "affirmative action" may embrace a
number of things, constitutional considerations come into play only
when affirmative action takes the form of racial preference. I Racial
preference is involved for constitutional purposes whenever the race of
persons is taken into account by the government in allocating benefits
or burdens, so that persons are subject to differential treatment on the
basis of race.2 Racial preference is involved when race is taken into ac-
count in determining admission to a publicly-supported university, 3 in
hiring and promotion in public employment, 4 or in entitlement to
governmental contracts. 5 At the present time, the constitutional ques-
tion arises in the context of racial preference being given to blacks and
other racial-ethnic groups, such as Hispanics and Native-Americans,
tProfessor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University of
Pittsburgh. -ED.
1. See Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1343
(9th Cir. 1979).
2. See Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 25.
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); cf.
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (private employment).
5. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 48 U.S.L.W. 4979 (1980).
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who, like blacks, have been subject to discrimination and victimization
in American society because the dominant white majority has per-
ceived them as "nonwhite."'6 While many of the traditional forms of
discrimination against blacks resulted in racial preference for whites,7
there was no need, for purposes of constitutional analysis, to
distinguish racial preference from the other forms of discrimination
against blacks. The use of race-conscious criteria that produced
discrimination against blacks invariably was found by the Supreme
Court to be "invidious" and hence unconstitutional, because in no case
could it be shown to be "necessary to the accomplishment of some per-
missible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the objective of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate.""
As I have discussed more fully elsewhere,9 constitutional doctrine
in regard to racial equality has developed with reference to the con-
cept of invidious racial discrimination. 10 The Constitution proscribes
invidious racial discrimination, which is the use of race-conscious
criteria not necessary to the accomplishment of a valid and substantial
governmental interest." The use of race-conscious criteria directed
6. Since these groups have been subject to discrimination and victimization
on this basis, for constitutional purposes, a legislative body should be able to include
them in any racial preference given to blacks. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Con-
stitution and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133, 136-39 (1979) [hereinafter Sedler, Beyond Bakke]. See also Greenawalt, The
Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 117-19 (1979).
As to the matter of inclusion in the preference, see Regents of the Univ. of. Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n.35 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
7. E.g., discrimination against blacks in employment or in admission to
universities.
8. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
9. Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution, 17 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 329, 368-72 (1977) [hereinafter Sedler, Racial Preference].
10. It has been contended that the Constitution should be interpreted to pro-
hibit "the differential treatment of other human beings by race," Van Alstyne, Rites of
Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809
(1979), and that "the proper constitutional principle is not, no 'invidious' racial or
ethnic discrimination, but no use ot racial or ethnic criteria in the distribution of
government benefits or burdens." Posner, supra note 2, at 25. My own view of racial
preference in terms of constitutional values is, of course, quite different. See Sedler,
Racial Preference, supra note 9, at 361-80. See also Perry, Modem Equal Protection:
A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1043-50 (1979).
Regardless of one's view as to how the Constitution should be interpreted, however, it
has not been interpreted to prohibit "differential treatment on the basis of race,"
where such "differential treatment" does not amount to invidious racial discrimina-
tion. And as Dean Sandalow has noted: "A constitutional principle that government
may not distribute burdens or benefits on racial or ethnic grounds is required neither
by the 'intentions of the framers' nor by a more general principle of constitutional
law." Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 675 (1975).
11. When race-conscious critera are employed, the state " must show that its
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial and that its use
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against whites is equally unconstitutional where it is not shown to be
necessary to the accomplishment of the requisite governmental in-
terest.1 2 Any use of race-conscious criteria by the government is sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny,' 5 and all invidious racial discrimination 4 is
unconstitutional whenever practiced by the government, whether at
the instance of whites or of blacks,'5 and whether the victims of such
discrimination are blacks, whites or both.' 6
For purposes of constitutional analysis then, there is a distinction
between the use of race-conscious criteria and invidious racial
discrimination. While it has been contended that any use of race-
conscious criteria that produces detriment to persons of the other race
amounts to racial discrimination and should be held to be unconstitu-
tional, '7 this has not been the Court's approach to the constitutionality
of the use of race-conscious criteria. The Court has interpreted the
Constitution to permit the use of race-conscious criteria, like other
criteria based on identifiable group membership, '8 where such criteria
of the [race-conscious] classification is 'necessary . . .to the accomplishment' of its
purpose or the safe-guarding of its interest." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 305 (citations omitted).
12. Cf Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (rejecting system-
atic exclusion of blacks or whites from jury service); New Orleans-City Park Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), affd per curtam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(rejecting denial to blacks of equal access to public facilities).
13. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), there was
some disagreement between Justice Powell and Justice Brennan over the meaning of
"strict scrutiny," with Justice Powell's view appearing to be more exacting. See Sedler,
Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 141-42. As to the significance of this disagreement in
regard to challenges to racial preference, compare Greenawalt, supra note 6, at
105-06 with Perry, supra note 10, at 1045.
14. The invidious racial discrimination doctrine relates, of course, to the ex-
press or otherwise intentional use of race-conscious criteria. Under the present state of
the law, the use of racially-neutral criteria having a racially-disproportionate impact
ordinarily is not unconstitutional. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
15. Cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discrimination by Mexican-
Americans in the "governing majority" against Mexican-Americans is tested under the
same standard as discrimination by whites in the "governing majority").
16. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-99 (1978)
(Powell, J.). This being so, it is submitted that any notion of "reverse" or "benign"
discrimination, in the sense of distinguishing analytically between the use of race-'
conscious criteria directed against racial minorities and the use of similar criteria
directed against whites is unsound.
17. See note 10 supra.
18. Such examples include gender, alienage, legitimacy, and age. There is no
doubt that the Constitution permits the government to classify on the basis of iden-
tifiable group membership, and such classifications have not infrequently been sus-
tained. If the government can constitutionally use gender, alienage, legitimacy, and
age "in the distribution of governmental benefits or burdens," it is difficult to see why
it is constitutionally precluded from ever using race for this purpose. Whenever
classifications on the basis of group membership are used "in the distribution of
governmental benefits or burdens," the constitutional question-sometimes obscured
by the debate over the appropriate standard of review-is necessarily the same: is the
"distribution of governmental benefits or burdens" on this basis necessary to the ad-
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use advances a valid and substantial governmental interest by what the
Court finds to be appropriate means.19 In such circumstances the use
of race-conscious criteria does not amount to invidious racial
discrimination and is constitutional despite detriment that it causes to
persons of either or both races.2 0 Unless the Court is to radically alter
existing constitutional doctrine in regard to racial equality, the con-
stitutionality of racial preference, like the constitutionality of any
other race-conscious criteria use, must be analyzed with reference to
the concept of invidious racial discrimination. This analysis makes the
constitutionality of racial preference depend on whether the use of
racial preference, in the circumstances presented, advances a valid
and substantial governmental interest by what the Court finds to be
appropriate means.
The matter of racial preference bitterly divides American society
today, 21 and is the subject of intense moral and philosophical debate. 22
But like many controversial questions of public concern, it has been
drawn into our constitutional system, and as Professor Dixon has
observed: "Once taken into our constitutional system, the dialogue
takes on a new seriousness. It is, therefore, critically important that we
get the questions right and the answers right, because constitutional
law is written in concrete and is not easily washed out by rain or
tears." 23 The right questions, however, and I would submit, the right
answers as well, must be formulated in light of constitutional doc-
trine2 4 that the Court has developed in regard to racial equality and in
vancement of a valid and substantial governmental interest. If so, then it is constitu-
tional. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Massachusetti Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The constitutional question is no different when the
"distribution of governmental benefits or burdens" is on the basis of race.
19. The concept of "appropriate means" seems to be the best way to express
the standard by which a court evaluates the permissibility of the particular use of race-
conscious criteria in relation to the advancement of the governmental interest found to
be valid and substantial. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 143-44 n.49.
20. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 157-62. See also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 48 U.S.L.W. 4979, 4988-89 (Burger, C.J.), 4998-99 (Marshall, J.) (1980).
21. See Lipset & Schneider, The Bakke Case: How Would It Be Decided at the
Bar of Public Opinion, PUB. OPINION, Mar./Apr. 1978, at 38.
22. Compare Cohen, Why Racial Preference is Illegal and Immoral, COMMEN-
TARY, June 1979, at 40 with Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A
Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 524 (1975). See generally EQUALITY
AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: A PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER (M.
Cohen ed. 1977).
23. Dixon, Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 69, 70 (1979).
24. The doctrine that the Court has developed must be related to the Court's
"institutional behavior," that is, to the pattern of results that is reached by the Court
in cases coming before it for decision. The Court's institutional behavior evolves over a
period of time and is not necessarily fully consistent with the doctrine articulated by
the Court to explain the basis of its decisions. As regards the doctrine of invidious
racial discrimination, the Court's behavior in applying that doctrine in the earlier
cases coming before it for decision has almost invariably been to invalidate the par-
ticular use of race-conscious criteria. But this was because in none of those cases could
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light of general principles of constitutional law. Since the doctrine that
the Court has developed in regard to racial equality is based on the
concept of invidious racial discrimination, which looks to whether the
use of race-conscious criteria in the circumstances presented advances
a valid and substantial governmental interest,2 5 the first "right ques-
tion" is whether the giving of racial preference in the circumstances
presented advances a valid and substantial governmental interest.
Racial preference also means that particular individuals will, because
of their race, receive a benefit at the expense of other individuals, who,
because of their race, will be denied that benefit. The second "right
question," then, is whether, assuming that the giving of racial
preference in the circumstances presented advances a valid and
substantial governmental interest, there is a principle of constitutional
law that renders the giving of the preference unconstitutional because
this causes "racial detriment" to particular individuals. It is these ques-
tions that will be explored in the present writing.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The constitutional issue, as I have formulated it in terms of the
"right questions," revolves around the governmental interest that is ad-
vanced by the giving of racial preference, and by the "racial detriment"
to particular individuals resulting from the racial preference. While at
the present time racial preference is almost invariably being given to
blacks and other nonwhite minorities, the constitutional inquiry does
not depend on the "direction" of the racial preference as such. Con-
stitutional doctrine in this sense is "universal," since, as I have said, all
invidious racial discrimination is unconstitutional whenever practiced
by the government, whether at the instance of whites or of blacks, and
whether the victims of such discrimination are blacks, whites or both. 26
If, for example, an ordinance were passed in a predominantly black ci-
ty reserving all public facilities for the exclusive use of blacks, that or-
dinance would be no less unconstitutional than an ordinance reserving
all public facilities for the exclusive use of whites, because the racial
the use of race-conscious criteria be shown to be "necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was
the objective of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate." Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See notes 7, 8 & accompanying text supra. The Court, however, in
more recent times, has sustained the constitutionality of the use of race-conscious
criteria because, in the circumstances presented, it was shown to be necessary to the
advancement of a valid and substantial governmental interest. See note 20 supra. In
this area, therefore, we see congruence between the Court's articulated doctrine and
its institutional behavior.
25. It is not necessary to repeat the additional requirement that it must do so
by what the Court finds to be appropriate means. See note 19 supra.
26. See notes 12-16 & accompanying text supra.
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preference in these circumstances either way cannot advance any valid
and substantial governmental interest. 27 Similarly, if a public universi-
ty used a racial quota in assigning places for no other purpose than to
prefer members of one racial group over another, the racial preference
again would not advance any valid and substantial governmental in-
terest, and would be unconstitutional whether the preference favored
blacks or whites. 28 On the other hand, where an employer has
discriminated on the basis of race, the courts can order a preferential
hiring or promotional remedy. In that case, "[t]he governmental in-
terest in preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of
others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vin-
dicated, ' '29 and it would make no difference whether the victims of the
employer's discrimination were black or white. 30
The analysis of the constitutional issue, then, is not affected by
the race of the beneficiaries of racial preference generally. However,
the race of the beneficiaries of the particular racial preference is highly
relevant to the question of whether the giving of that particular racial
preference, in the circumstances presented, advances a valid and
substantial governmental interest.
Racial preference in today's society is almost invariably racial
preference given to blacks, and the constitutionality of the use of
racial preference will be determined in that context3 1 The preference
27. See Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 9, at 373-74.
28. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell,
J.).
29. Id.
30. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, ,143 U.S. 193, 200-01
(1979); McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
31. The institutional behavior of the Court with respect to the constitu-
tionality of the use of race-conscious criteria must also be related to the context in
which the question arises. When the Court was dealing with the use of race-
conscious criteria directed against racial minorities, designed to maintain the system
of white supremacy, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), it is accurate to
say that the Court indicated that the Constitution "removed the race line from our
governmental systems." Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 783, quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But just as the prohibi-
tion against racial discrimination in Title VII "must be read . . . [in] the historical
context from which the Act arose," United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201 (1979), the Court's earlier indications as to the constitutional "ir-
relevancy" of race must also be taken in context. To paraphrase, Justice Powell's
discussion of congressional intent with respect to Title VI's prohibition against racial
discrimination: "[t]here simply was no reason for [the Court] to consider the validity
of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the [Court
was] dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those citizens
equal treatment." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285 (1978)
(Powell, J.). The guarantee of equal treatment has not been sufficient to overcome
the consequences of the long and tragic social history of racism in this nation. See
Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 135-41. It is not that "discrimination on the
basis of race" means one thing when the discrimination favors blacks and another
thing when it favors whites. Rather it is that there may be a valid and substantial
governmental interest in favoring blacks in order to overcome the present conse-
[Vol. 261232
1980] RACIAL PREFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1233
is given to blacks as a group at the expense of individual whites, 32 and
the constitutional issue generally has been framed in terms of a con-
flict between group rights and individual rights. In Bakke, for exam-
ple, Justice Powell stressed that, "[it is the individual who is entitled
to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or
ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal
rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a
particular group."33 And in rejecting the contention that redressing
the consequences of "societal discrimination" was a valid and substan-
tial governmental interest, justifying the use of racial preference,
Justice Powell stated: "Hence the purpose of helping certain groups
whom the faculty of the Davis medical school perceived as victims of
'societal discrimination' does not justify a classification that imposes
disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibil-
ity for whatever harm the beneficiaries are thought to have
suffered.13 4 Justice Brennan, while relating "societal discrimination"
to the social history of racism in this nation,3 r also framed the issue in
terms of group rights and individual rights, noting that the excluded
whites such as Bakke were not "stigmatized" by the racial preference,
and observing that:
If... the failure of minorities to qualify for admission to Davis
under regular procedures was due principally to the effects of
past discrimination, then there is a reasonable likelihood that,
but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have
failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of Davis'
special admissions program. 36
quences of past discrimination against blacks as a group, and in those circumstances
the "discrimination" does not amount to invidious racial discrimination for con-
stitutional purposes, just as the racial preference in Weber did not amount to
"discrimination on the basis of race" within the meaning of Title VII, and the use of
race as a factor in determining university admission did not amount to "discrimina-
tion on the ground of race" within the meaning of Title VI in Bakke.
32. The preference is not at the expense of whites as a group assuming that
the preference is a reasonable one. Whites as a group, of course, can have no
legitimate interest in maintaining their position of societal dominance. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
33. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell,
J.).
34. Id. 310.
35. Justice Brennan noted:
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimi-
nation is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of race-
conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding
that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the
handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the
medical school.
438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
36. Id. 365-66.
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In commenting on Bakke, Professor Dixon has observed that,
"[u]nderlying all of the opinions on the merits is the obvious need to
clarify our thinking on the concept of 'discrimination' itself, and the
emerging question of individual rights versus group rights in our con-
stitutional order," 37 and that, "[e]specially critical is the extent to
which the fourteenth amendment's traditional focus on individual
rights can be reshaped into-or replaced by-a group rights
concept.'38 Professor Greenawalt has stated the value conflict posed in
Bakke as follows:
On the one hand, justice requires that groups that have
previously suffered gross discrimination be given truly equal
opportunity in American life; on the other, justice precludes
the assignment of benefits and burdens on the arbitrary basis
of racial and ethnic characteristics. So long as steps to correct
racial injustice were limited to assuring that individual
members of minority groups would receive the same benefits
and opportunities available to persons like them except in
race, the steps implemented both these values (against the
competing claim that individuals and organizations should be
left free to assign benefits and opportunities on whatever
grounds they chose). But when individual blacks and members
of other minority groups began to be given benefits at the ex-
pense of whites who, apart from race, would have had a
superior claim to enjoy them, the values were brought into
sharp conflict . . . 9
As Professor Bell has succinctly put it from a different perspective,
whites resist paying the costs associated with racial preference
designed to overcome the consequences of societal racism. 40
I too originally approached Bakke in terms of the conflict between
the interests of blacks as a group and the interests of individual
whites. 4 1 I saw this conflict as in turn implicating the fourteenth
amendment values of racial neutrality and black freedom, 42 and con-
cluded that: "The resolution of that conflict may require a balancing,
37. Dixon, supra note 23, at 69.
38. Id. 75. The notion that a group as an entity can have rights to distributive
and compensatory justice has been the subject of considerable academic debate.
Compare Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF.
107 (1976) with Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (1976).
39. Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 87.
40. Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the U.ual Price of Racial
Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 3, 9-12 (1979).
41. Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 9, at 358-61.
42. As to the nature of the value of black freedom, see Sedler, Racial
Preference, supra note 9, at 365. See generally Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of
Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967).
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a reasonable accommodation between the interests of blacks as a
group in full integration into American society, and the interests of
whites as a group in racial neutrality and freedom from discrimina-
tion." 43 I concluded that a reasonable racial preference, such as that
involved in Bakke, satisfied this test and, therefore, was constitu-
tional. 4
My post-Bakke analysis of the constitutionality of racial preference
expanded on this theme and treated the group interest of blacks as one
of equal participation in all aspects of American life, which had been
denied to them by the social history of racism in this nation. It was my
submission that the government was constitutionally permitted to use
race-conscious criteria, including racial preference, in an appropriate
way, whenever the use of such criteria was related to providing equal
participation for blacks in all aspects of American life and thus over-
coming the present consequences of the social history of racism. 45
Overcoming the present consequences of the social history of racism, I
contend, is a constitutionally permissible objective in light of the
broad organic purpose of the fourteenth amendment, and the
reconstruction amendments, taken as a whole. 46 Since this is so, the
use of racial preference to accomplish that objective advances a valid
and substantial governmental interest and is constitutional. 47
There is, however, a further dimension to the equal participation
objective that I propose to develop more fully in the present writing:
the societal interest that is advanced by the equal participation of
blacks in any or all aspects of American life. Rather than view the con-
stitutionality of racial preference in terms of the conflict between the
interests of blacks as a group and the interests of individual whites, I
will now view it from the perspective of the societal interest in having
the equal participation of blacks in various aspects of American life.
When viewed from this perspective, the constitutional question no
longer revolves around whether group rights can be preferred to indi-
vidual rights, 48 but around whether the racial preference advances
societal interests and, if so, whether this justifies "racial detriment" to
individual whites.
43. Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 9, at 374.
44. Id. 378-80. It was reasonable, I contended, because it reserved only a
limited number of places for racial minorities, in relation to minority representation in
the general population, while all of the other places were available for white ap-
plicants.
45. Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 155-56.
46. Id. 156-57.
47. Again, assuming that this is accomplished by what the Court finds to be
appropriate means.
48. It is my submission, of course, that they can be when the preference for
group rights advances a valid and substantial governmental interest, such as overcom-
ing the present consequences of the social history of racism. Sedler, Racial Preference,
supra note 9, at 370-80; Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 163-71.
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It is my submission that there is strong societal interest in the
equal participation of blacks in all aspects of American life, and that
this being so, the government can give racial preference to advance
this interest, even though by doing so it causes "racial detriment" to
individual whites. In developing this submission, I will first explain
precisely what I mean by the equal participation objective. I will then
discuss the general principle of constitutional law that the government
can give preference to particular individuals over other individuals
when this advances societal interests, and show why this principle is no
less applicable when the societal interest is a racial one. In the final
section of the writing, I will show how the societal interest is advanced
by the equal participation of blacks in a number of important aspects
of American life. If I am correct in this submission, there can be no
doubt that racial preference designed to advance the equal participa-
tion objective is fully constitutional.
III. THE EQUAL PARTICIPATION OBJECTIVE
The equal participation objective relates to redressing the long
and tragic social history of racism in this nation, as a result of which
fundamental inequalities between blacks and whites permeate virtu-
ally every aspect of American life, 49 so that we still have "two societies,
black and white, separate and unequal."50 The goal of the equal par-
ticipation objective is to end white supremacy and black inequality in
all of its manifestations, and in the words of Justice Marshall, to
achieve "genuine equality" between blacks and whites in American
society.5 1
What the equal participation objective ultimately means is that
blacks as a group will participate equally with whites as a group in all
aspects of American life. Blacks, as well as whites, will participate in
societal governance. Blacks, as well as whites, will share positions of
power and prestige. Blacks will be meaningfully represented in the
American economic system, and blacks will not be disproportionately
lower-income in comparison with whites. The consequences of the
social history of racism will no longer be so strikingly visible in
American society.
Since the equal participation objective relates to redressing the
present consequences of the social history of racism in this nation, it is
necessarily a racial objective, and the frame of reference is necessarily
49. As to the extent of these fundamental inequalities, see Sedler, Beyond
Bakke, supra note 6, at 135-39.
50. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1
(Bantam ed. 1968).
51. 438 U.S. at 398 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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black and white.5 2 We are concerned with race, not with ethnicity.
Blacks are not an "ethnic group" in American society.5 3 They are the
historic "slave race" and the racial group against which the social
history of racism has been directed. As Professor Perry has observed:
"The material inequality of the races is the objective, concrete,
manifestation of the past widespread American belief in the moral
inequality of the races and of racially discriminatory practices reflec-
ting that belief.15 4 The social history of racism clearly was predicated
on a belief in the moral inferiority of blacks, a belief that was
necessary to justify the institution of chattel slavery, and a belief that
persisted to justify pervasive racial discrimination and victimization of
blacks throughout American society.
This pervasive racial discrimination and vicitimization, relating to
a belief in the moral inferiority of blacks, is qualitatively different
from the kind of discrimination that has been practiced in times past
against white ethnic groups in this nation. As was observed by the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: "European im-
migrants too suffered from discrimination, but never was it so per-
vasive as the prejudice against color in America, which has formed a
bar to advancement, unlike any other." 5 While white supremacy and
advantage may not be evenly distributed throughout all segments of
the white population,. 6 it is the supremacy of whites as a group and
the inequality of blacks as a group that has resulted from the social
history of racism, and the equal participation objective is designed to
remedy the condition of racial inequality. This being so, the
legitimacy of advancing the equal participation objective and of
achieving "genuine racial equality" in American society is not affected
by the fact that in the past some segments of the white population
have been subject to discrimination by dominant segments of that
population and may not share to the same degree all the advantages
that have come with being white in American society.5 7
52. As to the inclusion of other non-white minorities in the legislative defini-
tion of "black," see note 6 supra.
53. Justice Powell appeared to assume this throughout his opinion in Bakke.
54. Perry, supra note 10, at 1040.
55. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
279 (Bantam ed. 1968). Similarly, as Justice Marshall observed in Bakke:
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in
degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of
slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law.
And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot
has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even
made it into the pot.
438 U.S. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
56. See Justice Powell's discussion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 295-97 (1978).
57. Most persons probably still would agree that on balance, even with
"affirmative action," it is better to be white than to be black in American society to-
day.
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The equal participation objective is not based on any notion of
"reparations" or "proportionality." It does not mean that because
blacks have been subject to a long history of discrimination and vic-
timization, white society owes blacks "reparations" and must give
blacks benefits now at the expense of whites. Nor does it mean that
blacks as a group are entitled to the "proportionate" share of the
benefits of American society that they would have received had it not
been for the social history of racism or a share of those benefits in ex-
act proportion to their representation in the general population. 8 In
attacking the constitutionality of racial preference, Professor Dixon
states that "there is the plea from many blacks for reparations in the
form of a substantial approximation to ethnic proportionality in the
allocation of scarce social goods," and contends that "a policy of
ethnic proportionality that qualifies a person's equality of opportunity
has no foundation in our individual-rights focused constitutional
tradition."5 9 Regardless of the validity of Professor Dixon's attack on
"reparations" and "proportionality," that attack cannot properly be
mounted against the equal participation objective. The equal par-
ticipation objective is not concerned with "reparations" for the past or
with "proportionality," but with the absence of full participation of
blacks as a group in all aspects of American life. It is concerned with
the present consequences of the social history of racism that are felt by
blacks as a group today. The equal participation objective does not
seek to give blacks the proportionate share of societal participation
and power that they would have had in the absence of the social
history of racism, but to give blacks as a group some meaningful share
of societal participation and power, and to bring them into the
"mainstream of American life." '60
The focus of the equal participation objective, then, is on the pre-
sent consequences of past discrimination. If no present consequences
remained, despite past discrimination, there would be no basis for
invoking the equal participation objective. This is another basis for
distinguishing the situation of blacks from the situation of white ethnic
groups, and it also points up the irrelevancy of "reparations" and
"proportionality" to the equal participation objective. For example, it
cannot be doubted that there has been past discrimination against
58. What they are entitled to is a "degree of participation in American society
roughly equal to that enjoyed by whites." Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 157.
Insofar as the legislative body determines the extent of the particular preference with
reference to minority representation in the general population, this relates to an effort
to make the preference a reasonable one, not to any notion of' proportionate entitle-
ment."
59. Dixon, supra note 23, at 74 & discussion at 84-85.
60. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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Jews in America. Let us assume that if it had not been for such
discrimination, Jews as a group would have a greater share of societal
power than they now have; for example, that there would be more
Jewish physicians and lawyers than there are now.61 But Jews as a
group have not been excluded from a "fair share" of societal power
and Jews as a group participate fully in all aspects of American life.
There are, for example, quite a substantial number of Jewish physi-
cians and lawyers. 62 If blacks as a group, despite the social history of
racism, also had a "fair share" of societal power and were par-
ticipating fully in all aspects of American life today, there would be no
justification for invoking the equal participation objective and racial
preference for blacks could not be sustained on this basis. Similarly,
although Asian-Americans have been subject to discrimination that
can be characterized as "racial, ' 63 Asian-Americans as a group also
appear to have a "fair share" of societal power and participation in
relation to their representation among the general population, and
preference for Asian-Americans cannot be justified as necessary to ad-
vance the equal participation objective. 64 In other words, the justifica-
tion for the invocation of the equal participation objective is that the
social history of racism has produced present consequences for blacks
as a group, denying to blacks as a group equal participation in
American society and relegating them to a condition of racial ine-
quality.6 5
The Court in Bakke did not deal directly with the constitutionality
of the use of racial preference to advance the equal participation
objective. Both Justice Powell and Justice Brennan saw the issue as one
of remedying "societal discrimination," and as we have said, framed
the constitutional question in terms of a conflict between group rights
and individual 'rights. Justice Marshall, however, emphasized the
equal participation objective and related it to overcoming present con-
sequences of the social history of racism. As he stated:
61. Whether this in fact would be so depends on the time when the discrimina-
tion essentially ended.
62. On a personal note, when I was in law school, which was over 20 years ago,
I did not feel conscious of being Jewish, since there were a number of other Jewish
students in the class. There was not a single black student in the class.
63. See note 6 supra.
64. See the discussion in Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 120. In 1973, 13 Asians
were admitted to the entering class at the Davis medical school through the general
admissions process and only two were admitted through the special program, "thus
creating doubt that Asians as a class needed the preference." Id. 120 n.133.
Preference for Asians generally, however, could be justified in order to advance the
"educational diversity" objective.
65. As Professor Greenawalt points out, the Brennan opinion in Bakke re-
quires a "combination of past discrimination and present disadvantage" in order to
support racial preference as a means of redressing "societal discrimination."
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 115.
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its
devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro
into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest
of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America
will forever remain a divided society ....
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now
must permit the institutions of this society to give considera-
tion to race in making decisions about who will hold the posi-
tions of influence, affluence and prestige in America. For far
too long, the doors to those positions have been shut to
Negroes. If we are ever to become a fully integrated society,
one in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the
opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing to
take steps to open those doors. I do not believe that anyone
can truly look into America's past and still find that a remedy
for the effects of that past is impermissible.
66
As will be demonstrated subsequently, there is a strong societal inter-
est in bringing blacks "into the mainstream of American life." It is my
submission that the existence of that strong societal interest justifies
the use of racial preference to advance the equal participation objec-
tive.
IV. RACIAL DETRIMENT AND SOCIETAL INTEREST
In the next section of the writing I will discuss the societal interest
in the equal participation objective. When the equal participation
objective is advanced by means of racial preference, however, this
causes racial detriment to whites. By racial detriment I mean tangible
detriment caused to particular white individuals by the preference
given to blacks in the allocation of societal benefits. Racial detriment
is suffered by the white applicant excluded from admission to a pub-
licly-supported university because of preference for black applicants.
It is suffered by the white denied public employment or promotion
because of preference for blacks. It is suffered by the white entrepre-
neur who loses out on a public works contract because of preference
given to black entrepreneurs. The question with which I am now con-
cerned is whether the use of racial preference, which otherwise is
found to advance a valid and substantial governmental interest,
becomes unconstitutional because it causes racial detriment to par-
ticular white individuals. It is submitted that the answer is clearly in
the negative.
It is a general principle of constitutional law that individuals may
66. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396, 401-02 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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be required to make sacrifices in the public interest, and the public
interest may require that particular individual interests be preferred
over other interests and that particular individuals receive benefits at
the expense of other individuals. This general principle is applicable
in a number of contexts. Perhaps the Court's strongest exposition of
the principle occurred in Miller v. Schoene.6 7 There it sustained
against a due process attack a state statute requiring the destruction of
cedar trees found to be the host plant for cedar rust, where the cedar
trees were located within two miles of an apple orchard. Cedar rust,
although having no effect on cedar trees, could destroy apple trees
within a two mile radius, and since apple-growing was a major indus-
try in Virginia, the legislature decided to protect the apple trees at the
expense of the cedar trees. In holding that this was constitutional, the
Court stated:
• . . [t]he state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order
to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of
greater value to the public. It will not do to say that the case is
merely one of a conflict of two private interests and that the
misfortune of apple growers may not be shifted to the cedar
owners by ordering the destruction of their property; for it is
obvious that there may be, and that here there is, a
preponderant public concern in the preservation of the one in-
terest over the other. And where the public interest is involved
preferment of that interest over the property interest of the
individual, to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the
distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police
power which affects property.
68
The giving of benefits to particular individuals and groups at the
expense of other individuals and groups on the ground that societal
interests are advanced thereby appears in much economic and social
regulation. The government can create a monopoly in favor of a par-
ticular enterprise or individual. 69 It can prohibit new entrants into a
business activity, thereby favoring established enterprises, on the
ground that further competition would be "detrimental to public
interest. '70 It can favor the financial interests of debtors over the
financial interests of creditors by declaring a moratorium on mortgage
67. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
68. Id. 279-80 (citations omitted).
69. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
70. "Lochner era" cases holding to the contrary, such as New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), and Louis K. Leggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928), have been overruled. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
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payments during times of economic depression. 7 It can require con-
sumers to pay higher prices for the benefit of producers. 2 It can do all
of these things, because the benefit that one individual receives at the
expense of another individual is deemed to advance societal interests.
The government can also give preference to particular individuals
over other individuals when it is allocating governmental benefits, on
the ground that by so doing it is advancing societal interests. It can
give preference in civil service employment to veterans over non-
veterans, including those who were not eligible to serve in the armed
forces.73 It can give preference in admission to publicly-supported
universities to athletes and give them special scholarships because their
skills are useful to the university's athletic programs. 74 It can make
classifications in regard to entitlement to welfare benefits that have
the effect of denying the benefit to otherwise deserving persons,
because the classification avoids the necessity of individual determina-
tions, thus saving costs and making more funds available to other per-
sons eligible for the benefit. 75 Again, the preference for some individ-
uals over other individuals is justified in terms of the advancement of
societal interests.
In all of these instances there is an element of unfairness. As
regards veterans preference, for example, while some veterans may
have suffered detriment because of their military service, 76 this is not
true of all veterans. Indeed, some veterans may have acquired
marketable skills in military service that they would not have acquired
in civilian life, and they receive a "double benefit" when those
marketable skills and their veteran's status result in their receiving a
civil service position. Until recently, no more than 2% of the members
of the armed forces could be women, so most women could not
acquire veteran status. Even though a woman may be "more
qualified" for a civil service position in terms of "objective merit," she
may lose out to the veteran. But while the veterans preference may be
unfair, it is not unjustifiable. It is not unjustifiable because the
legislature has determined that veteran's preference in the civil service
71. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. :398 (1934).
72. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
73. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), affd mem., 410
U.S. 976 (1973). Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (prefer-
ence statute upheld against equal protection claim of sex discrimination).
74. See Justice Blackmun's discussion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 404 (1978).
75. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
76. This has been the primary rationale relied on by the courts to sustain the
constitutionality of veterans preference. See Branch v. Dubois, 418 F. Supp. 1128,
1130 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252, 260 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (D. Minn. 1972).
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advances an important societal interest, and that determination is a
reasonable one. 77 There is unfairness in requiring owners of cedar
trees to sacrifice their trees for the benefit of apple tree owners, but it
is justifiable to require them to make this sacrifice because the
legislature has concluded that society's interest is better served by pro-
tecting the apple trees. It is unfair to deny new enterprises the oppor-
tunity to compete against established enterprises, but again denial of
the opportunity is justifiable because the legislature has concluded
that further competition would not be in the public interest. It is
unfair to deny welfare benefits to claimants who could establish their
entitlement to the benefit if an individualized determination was
made, but the societal interest is deemed better served by denying
them the benefit to avoid the costs of individual determinations and
make more funds available to pay benefits to other claimants. In all of
these instances it is unfair, but it is not unjustifiable. It is not un-
justifiable because societal interests are advanced by preferring some
individuals and groups over other individuals and groups. And
because it is not unjustifiable, it is not unconstitutional.
The principle that the societal interest may require that particular
individuals receive benefits at the expense of other individuals is no
less applicable where the societal interest advanced by the giving of the
preference is a racial interest and the preference is a racial one. It may
be contended that there is a significant difference between preferring
apple tree owners over cedar tree owners and preferring black appli-
cants to medical school over white applicants to medical school,
because the former situation involves economic and societal legislation
subject to "minimal scrutiny" under the "rational basis" test, while the
latter situation involves a racial classification which is "suspect" and
subject to "strict scrutiny." But this difference has no relevance to the
point in issue. "Strict scrutiny" relates to the degree with which the
Court scrutinizes the justification for the racial classification and the
validity of the asserted governmental interest, and the appropriateness
of the racial classification as a means of advancing the interest. As
Justice Powell explained "strict scrutiny" in Bakke: "When they
[classifications] touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background,
he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to
bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest." 78
As Bakke makes clear, however, there is no question that when the
racial classification, or more accurately, the racial preference, is
77. It is reasonable because the legislature has some degree of discretion in
making classifications with respect to governmental benefits, and can conclude that
the majority of veterans have suffered detriment because of their military service.
78. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (Powell, J.).
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"precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest," an
individual can be asked to bear the burden resulting from that
preference. Thus, in Bakke, when Justice Powell, joined on this point
by the Brennan group, 79 held that the medical school had a valid
interest in achieving an "educationally diverse" student body, so that it
could give "competitive consideration to race and ethnic origin" in
determining admission to the medical school, 0 he necessarily held
that this interest could be advanced at the expense of those white
applicants who were excluded from the medical school as a result.8 '
This is but an application in the racial preference context of the
general constitutional principle that the societal interest may require
that particular individuals receive benefits at the expense of other
individuals.82
It is clear, therefore, that if the societal interest in achieving the
equal participation objective is found to be valid and substantial, the
use of racial preference to advance the interest is constitutional, not-
withstanding that it causes racial detriment to particular white indi-
viduals.
V. THE SOCIETAL INTEREST IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION
OBJECTIVE
When talking about the societal interest in the equal participation
objective, I am not concerned with whether the government has a
valid and substantial interest in providing equal participation for
blacks so that blacks can obtain benefits from such participation. 83
79. Id. 311-15 (Powell, J.); id. 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
80. Id. 320 (Powell, J.).
81. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 164-65.
82. See the discussion of this point in regard to the set-off for minority business
enterprises in Fulliove. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4989. By the same token, the government
could give racial preference to whites where this would advance a valid and substantial
governmental interest by appropriate means. A state university, with a predominantly
black student body, in order to advance its interest in achieving a racially diverse stu-
dent body, could give the kind of racial preference to white applicants that the medi-
cal school in Bakke was permitted to give to black applicants. Or, a public housing
authority could assign persons to its housing on a racial basis in order to insure that all
sites would be racially integrated, even if there were more blacks than whites on the
waiting list so that some whites would obtain public housing sooner in preference to
some blacks. See Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
83. It was this theme that I developed in Beyond Bakke. As I started there:
Remedying the effects of past societal discrimination - of the social history of
racism -and providing equal protection for blacks in all aspects of American
life furthers the goal of racial equality that lies at the heart of the fourteenth
amendment. Whenever the government acts to advance this objective, it is
acting to advance a valid and substantial governmental interest.
Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 170-71.
I am not qualifying my position in any way by maintaining that in addition there is a
strong societal interest in the equal participation objective. Nonetheless, the focus on
the societal interest rather than on the interest of blacks may tend to perpetuate the
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The societal interest to which I am referring is the interest of the soci-
ety itself in the benefits that result from the equal participation of
blacks in any or all aspects of American life. Although the Court in
Bakke did not deal directly with the equal participation objective, it
did deal directly with the matter of the societal interest, and it is the
societal interest that is the basis of Justice Powell's conclusion that the
medical school could use race-conscious admissions criteria8 4 in order
to achieve an "educationally diverse" student body. As Professor Dixon
has observed:
justice Powell's diversity idea is based on an interest of the
znstitution-that is, an enterprise interest in an enriched
educational atmosphere -rather than on an interest held by
the represented minority group. This seems to be Justice
Powell's view, despite the fact that the represented groups are
the immediate beneficiaries of the policy, and the proximate
cause of the hypothesized enrichment.
8 5
This is precisely the point that I want to make about the societal inter-
est in the equal participation objective. The focus is on the societal in-
terest that is advanced by having the equal participation of blacks in
various aspects of American life. Just as the university in Bakke could
assert its own institutional interest to support the use of race-conscious
admissions criteria, other agencies of government can assert both their
particular institutional interest and the interest of the society they
serve in having the equal participation of blacks, so as to justify their
use of racial preference in the circumstances presented. This points up
the distinction between the societal interest in the equal participation
objective that I am discussing in the present writing and the group
interest of blacks in the equal participation objective that I discussed
in earlier writings . 6
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke also gives some insights,
perhaps unintended, on precisely why there is a societal interest in
the equal participation of blacks in the various aspects of American
life. Although purportedly applying a standard of "strict scrutiny,"
Justice Powell appeared to be giving considerable deference to the
university's contention that it had a valid and substantial interest in
achieving an "educationally diverse" student body, so as to justify
regrettable process of viewing "affirmative action" with reference to "white interests"
and from a "white perspective." See Bell, supra note 40, at 3-9.
84. This necessarily involves racial preference in that it enables particular
blacks to be admitted in preference to particular whites who would have been admit-
ted if race-conscious admissions criteria had not been used.
85. Dixon, supra note 23, at 75-76.
86. There is a valid and substantial governmental interest in providing equal
participation for blacks. See note 83 supra.
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the use of race-conscious admissions criteria."7 Justice Powell stated
that, "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so
widely essential to the quality of higher education-is widely believed
to be promoted by a diverse student body" and concluded that, "[i]n
this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve the goal that
is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." 88 But
there is very little discussion about racial diversity as such in the opin-
ion, and Justice Powell does not explicate why race as such contributes
in a major way to educational diversity. 9 The answer may be that this
is so obvious that he considered extended discussion of the point to be
unnecessary. Such an explanation is fortified by his reference to the
Harvard College Admission Program, in which it is simply stated that,
"[a] black student can usually bring something that a white person
cannot offer." 90
The reason why this is so relates to the perspective that comes
from "the experience of being black in America." Professor Blasi
has contended that, "[i]t is difficult to maintain that there is any one
trait that compares with race in terms of the likely contribution of
persons who possess the trait to the goal of diversifying," and that,
"most educational institutions can rightly regard racial homogeneity
as by far the greatest threat to the goal of a truly diverse educational
environment." 9' Professor Blasi relates the contribution of blacks to
"educational diversity" because of their race by having gone
through the "black experience" in American society, and concludes
that, "membership in a minority race can be viewed as a good proxy
for several personal characteristics that may be important in the lear-
ning process." 92 At a minimum, blacks can tell to others first hand
87. See the very penetrating analysis of Justice Powell's "two opinions" in
Bakke, in Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7-20 (1979). As they note, Justice Powell's scrutiny of
the university's "educational diversity" claim "is far from exacting." Id. 12.
88. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (Powell,
J.). See the discussion of this statement in relation to "strict scrutiny" in Karst &
Horowitz, supra note 87, at 12-13.
89. He refers to race or ethnic origin as a "single though important element" in
achieving "educational diversity." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
315 (1978) (Powell, J.).
90. Id. 316.
91. Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory? 67
CALIF. L. REV. 21, 43, 45 (1979).
92. Id. 44. As he states:
Compared to his white counterpart, a black applicant is much more likely
to: (1) have been the object of racial prejudice in a wide variety of contexts,
and thus have first hand knowledge about the nature and impact of such
prejudice; (2) have had his aspirations seriously influenced by preceptions
regarding what opportunities were available to persons of his race, and thus
have a special appreciation of the social significance of aspiration and self-
esteem; (3) have had personal relationships with people who are very poor
and frequently unemployed; (4) have spent a great. deal of time coming to
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what racial discrimination is all about, for, as Justice Marshall
observed in Bakke, "the racism of our society has been so pervasive
that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape
its impact. '9 3 A university may conclude, then, that in order for its
student body to be truly diverse, there must be some black represen-
tation in that student body.
94
Let me analyze the result in Bakke with reference to the societal
interest in the equal participation objective. The university was per-
mitted to give racial preference in determining admission to its
medical school because the participation of blacks in the educational
program of that school contributed to "educational diversity," and
so advanced the school's educational goals. 95 The university could
conclude that, in light of "the experience of being black in
America," a black student "can usually bring something that a
white person cannot offer" to the university's educational program.
grips with his own racial identity as well as thinking and talking about the
social problem of race relations; (5) have been the object of special scrutiny
by others who were curious to see how a person of his race would behave or
perform in the particular situation, and thus have an appreciation of the
"fishbowl" phenomenon in social relations; (6) feel a responsibility to help
mitigate the suffering of the persons who have been most oppressed by social
and political patterns that can be traced in part to racial prejudice; (7)
display a special interest in and knowledge about the black experience in the
United States and the rest of the world; and (8) feel a disenchantment with,
if not hostility toward, social structures and institutions (including principles
of distribution) that historically have operated to the detriment of black peo-
ple. These are characteristics for which the trait of membership in a minority
race is a good proxy.
93. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As Karst and Horowitz succinctly put it: "It
is the history of racial subordination, above all, that makes race socially significant. If
a black student can 'bring something that a white person cannot offer' the 'something'
is, primarily, an inheritance from past societal discrimination." Karst & Horowitz,
supra note 87, at 16-17.
94. Also that this representation must be in more than token numbers.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (Powell, J., appendix).
95. Professor Greenawalt has observed:
I have yet to find a professional academic who believes the primary motiva-
tion for preferential admissions has been to promote diversity in the student
body for the better education of all the students while they are in profes-
sional school. Diversity is undoubtedly one reason for such programs, but the
justification of countering the effects of societal discrimination relied on by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun comes closer to stating
their central purpose, and Justice Powell offers no convincing reason for re-
jecting that justification and accepting the diversity argument.
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 16. While I agree fully with Professor Greenawalt's assess-
ment of the real motivation for racial preference in professional school admissions,
"educational diversity" would qualify as "purpose" in regard to constitutional analysis,
and the "real motivation" would be constitutionally irrelevant. Cf. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (legislators' "purpose" irrelevant in constitutional
challenge to statute). As to compliance with Bakke, see generally Lesnick, What Does
Bakke Require of Law Schools, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 141 (1979).
WAYNE LAW REVIEW
There was thus a societal interest in the equal participation objective
here, in that participation of blacks in the university's educational
program improved the educational quality of that program. This be-
ing so, the use of racial preference in determining admission to the
medical school advanced a valid and substantial governmental in-
terest and was constitutional.
Reasoning from Bakke, there would appear to be a societal inter-
est in the equal participation objective whenever a "black [person]
can . . . bring something that a white person cannot offer" to any
governmental institution, so that the institution, because of black par-
ticipation, will be in a better position to perform its institutional func-
tion. Consider first the police function, which "fulfills a fundamental
obligation of government to its constituency." 96 Blacks have tradi-
tionally been grossly underrepresented in municipal police forces, even
in cities having a substantial black population, and virtually non-
existent in state police forces. 97 Frequently, this has been shown to
have been the product of unlawful racial discrimination, and racially
preferential hiring and promotional remedies have been ordered on
this basis. 98 But suppose that a city concludes that, without regard to
identified past discrimination, it wants substantial black participation
in the police function, which is now lacking. It then adopts a racially
preferential hiring and promotional program, designed to increase
significantly the number of black officers and supervisors. 99 There can
be no doubt that participation by blacks in the all-important police
function advances the societal interest in the effective performance of
that function. So long as blacks are grossly underrepresented in the
police department, the police will be perceived of by the black com-
munity as an "occupying army," as was so tragically demonstrated in
the 1967 riots. 100 According to the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice:
In order to gain the general confidence and acceptance of a
community, personnel within a police department should be
96. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978).
97. See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
DISORDERS, 315-18 (Bantam ed. 1968).
98. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
99. When the City of Detroit adopted a racially preferential hiring and promo-
tion policy with respect to the police department in July, 1974, the city had a black
population of nearly 50%, but a police force that was only 17% black. Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 681 (6th Cir. 1979). Based on my personal
knowledge as counsel for one of the amicae in the case, less than 5% of the supervisors
were black.
100. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DIsoRDERs
299-301 (Bantam ed. 1968).
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representative of the community as a whole .... If minority
groups are to feel that they are not policed entirely by a white
police force, they must see that Negro or other minority
officers participate in policymaking and other crucial deci-
sions.10 1
As the Sixth Circuit put it, in holding that racial preference in police
promotions could advance a valid and substantial governmental inter-
est:
The argument that police need more minority officers is not
simply that blacks communicate better with blacks or that a
police department should cater to the public desires. Rather it
is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily
on the public support and confidence in the police. In short,
the focus is not on the superior performance of minority
officers, but on the public's perception of law enforcement
officials and institutions.1 0 2
The equal participation by blacks in the police function, then, clearly
serves the societal interest in effective law enforcement. This being so,
the use of racial preference to implement the equal participation
objective advances a valid and substantial governmental interest and
should be upheld as constitutional. 10
3
There is also a societal interest in the equal participation of blacks
in all functions of government. The Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, when recommending the extension of Title VII to
state and local governments, observed that: "The exclusion of
minorities from effective participation in the bureaucracy not only
promotes ignorance of minority problems in that particular communi-
ty, but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too often hostility
toward the entire process of government. 10 4 The equal participation
101. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE at 167 (1967).
102. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979).
In that case the city claimed that the racially preferential promotions program which
was in issue was necessary to remedy the city's own prior discrimination and that, apart
from identified prior discrimination, the program was necessary for "operational
needs." The district court, applying an erroneous legal standard, held that prior
discrimination was not shown. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings in regard to both the prior discrimination claim and the operational needs
claim.
103. As to the governmental interest in advancing the equal participation objec-
tive for the benefit of the black citizenry in this context, see Sedler, Beyond Bakke,
supra note 6, at 169 n.154. It was this argument that I presented in the amicus brief in
Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
104. SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d. CONG., 2d
SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972,
at 419 (1972).
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of blacks in all functions of government, then, serves important
societal interests by (1) insuring that the government will be aware of
the problems and needs of minority communities, (2) insuring that the
government, while making and implementing governmental policy,
will have the benefit of the perspective that comes from "the ex-
perience of being black in America," and (3) helping to bring about
confidence in the institutions of government on the part of the black
community. 0 Again, the use of racial preference to implement the
equal participation objective in this context advances a valid and
substantial governmental interest and should be upheld as constitu-
tional.
Now consider the societal interest in the equal participation of
blacks in the "power professions," such as law and medicine. As Justice
Marshall argued in Bakke, "[i]t is because of a legacy of unequal treat-
ment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give
consideration to race in making the decisions about who will hold the
positions of influence, affluence and prestige in America."' 0 6 As a
lawyer, I am fully aware of the power and influence that lawyers as a
group wield in American society, not only in regard to their role in the
legal system and the administration of justice, but in legislatures,
governmental bodies, and many other important societal institutions.
Being a lawyer means that one is in a position, by virtue of one's pro-
fession, to do significant things in American society.
Since entry into the profession is almost entirely dependent upon
admission to law school, the requirements for admission to law school
are also requirements for admission to the profession. 07 In determin-
ing its requirements for admission, therefore, the law school may
properly take into account the societal interest in the makeup of the
legal profession. As Professor Greenawalt has observed:
Universities and particularly professional schools have long
made decisions about who will have the keys to important
societal positions through determinations about admissions
and scholarships. Implicit in the exercise of such power is some
vision of the public welfare. It would seem appropriate for a
law school to choose not to limit consideration even to such
broad concerns as potential ability as a lawyer and likely area
of legal employment. A school might well, for example, admit
105. As to the need for minority participation in governmental decision-
making, see also Ginger, Who Needs Afirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
265, 270-73 (1979).
106. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 401 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
107. Henkin, What of the Right to Practice a Profession? 67 CALIF. L. REV.
131, 136 (1979).
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a student it thought had great potential for political leader-
ship, though believing he might perform less well as a lawyer
than some rejected applicant. It requires no substantial exten-
sion of the institutional responsibility to determine who will
become members of the profession for institutions to make
some judgments about the social desirability of broadening the
availability of professional positions, in the belief that a more
diverse and representative profession will enrich the
understanding of all its members of relevant social problems
and will otherwise promote a more harmonious and integrated
society. 108
Although the black population at the time of the last census was 11%,
less than 2% of the lawyers in this country are black,10 9 and blacks
clearly are not equal participants in the exercise of societal power that
is reflected in membership in the legal profession.
A publicly-supported university law school, whose admission
requirements are also requirements for the admission to the profession
in that state, can reasonably conclude that there is a strong societal
interest in having the equal participation of blacks in the legal profes-
sion. It can conclude that something is missing when the perspective
that comes from "the experience of being black in America" is not
adequately represented in the profession. The societal interest in the
equal participation of blacks in the legal profession is not so much that
black lawyers will be available to represent black clients," 0 but that
blacks will be participants in the exercise of societal power by the legal
profession and will be able to bring the "black perspective" to that
exercise of societal power. Blacks will be judges and prosecutors and
law professors. They will be laywers for the government, "members of
the firm," and bar association officers. They will be in a direct posi-
tion to contribute to the development of the American legal system
and to make that system responsive to the needs of black people. In
addition, black people will have greater confidence in the legal system
and in the administration of justice, because blacks, as well as whites,
108. Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 124. In this regard Professor Greenawalt also
notes that:
Indeed it can be argued that the main reasons why applicants with superior
qualifications are themselves ordinarily picked has to do with social utility
rather than their intrinsic deserts and that they, therefore, have no convinc-
ing complaint when reasons of social utility lead to choosing less well-
qualified applicants, at least so long as the grounds of the differentiation are
otherwise acceptable.
Id. 126 n.150.
109. Sedler, Racial Preference, supra note 9, at 347-48 n.70.
110. The interest of blacks in the equal participation objective would relate to
having the opportunity to be represented by black lawyers if they choose just as whites
have the opportunity to be represented by white lawyers if they choose, and the in-
terest of having blacks participate in the legal system and the administration of justice.
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will be full participants in that system. There is, then, a strong societal
interest in equal participation by blacks in the legal profession, and
racial preference in law school admissions advances that societal inter-
est.
It may be queried whether the Court in Bakke would have viewed
racially preferential admissions in a different light if that case had
involved admission to law school rather than admission to medical
school. The ways in which lawyers exercise societal power, of course,
would have been clear to the Court. The ways in which physicians
exercise societal power may have been less clear. Moreover, it appears
that the university's societal interest justification for racially preferen-
tial admissions to the medical school related to the Fact that minority
physicians were more likely to serve currently underrepresented minor-
ity communities.' 1 ' Justice Powell took the position that the university
"simply has not carried its burden of demonstrating that it must prefer
members of particular ethnic groups over all other individuals in order
to promote better health care delivery to deprived citizens." 2 Leaving
aside, however, the question of whether black physicians are more
likely to serve black communities than are white physicians,13 the
societal interest advanced by the equal participation of blacks in the
medical profession does not relate to their practicing in black com-
munities. Like the societal interest in the equal participation of blacks
in the legal profession, the societal interest in the equal participation
of blacks in the medical profession relates to incorporating the "black
perspective" in the exercise of societal power by the medical profes-
sion. The medical profession exercises societal power in a very signifi-
cant way by controlling, to a large degree, the nation's health care
delivery system. Physicians do much more than treat patients. They
serve on hospital staffs and medical committees. They are involved in
decisions that affect the kind of medical services that will be offered
and the cost of those services. They influence the distribution of
medical resources and the location of health care facilities. They per-
form substantially the same function with respect to the health care
111. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310-11 (1978) (Powell,
J.).
112. Id. 311.
113. The empirical evidence strongly indicates that they do. A major study by
the National Planning Association concluded that: (1) young minority physicians are
locating at unprecedented rates in the south, where minority urban and rural popula-
tions have traditionally been underserved; (2) minority physicians are more likely to
settle in large cities with concentrations of low-income populations; (3) they are more
likely to engage in primary care practice; (4) they are more likely to practice in large
city public hospitals, neighborhood health centers and other public institutions
responsible for providing services to low-income persons. Koleda & Craig, Minority
Physicians Practice Patterns and Access to Health Care Service, LOOKING AHEAD, Vol.
2, No. 6 (1976).
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delivery system that lawyers do with respect to the legal system and the
administration of justice.
Entry to the profession is completely dependent upon admission to
medical school, and the enormous cost of training physicians severely
constrains the number of new entrants into the profession. As with
publicly-supported law schools, publicly-supported medical schools
control entry to the profession in that state, and they can reasonably
conclude that there is a strong societal interest in having the equal
participation of blacks in the medical profession so that blacks can be
involved, along with whites, in that profession's control over the health
care delivery system. There is a considerable "health gap" between
blacks and whites in this nation, with blacks as a group having higher
mortality and morbidity rates than whites as a group and with black
communities being underrepresented in the delivery of health care ser-
vices.11 4 It is certainly reasonable to believe that the equal participa-
tion of black physicians in the medical profession can contribute to
ending the "health gap" between blacks and whites. Black physicians
would seem for the most part to be in a better position than white
physicians to assess the health care needs of black communities and to
understand the difficulties that black people have in making use of the
traditionally white-dominated health care delivery system. They could
also be expected to be more disposed to "lobby" for the provision of
adequate health care facilities for black communities. The equal par-
ticipation of blacks in the health care delivery system, like equal par-
ticipation of blacks in the legal system, serves a strong societal interest,
and a publicly-supported medical school is justified giving racial
preference in admissions to advance that societal interest. If the
societal interest in the equal participation of blacks in the medical
profession- focusing on their participation in the health care delivery
system- had been emphasized in Bakke, it is possible that Justice
Powell would have found that interest to be "compelling."1 15
I want now to consider the societal interest in the equal participa-
tion of blacks in what may be called the "American economic system."
Blacks as a group do not participate equally in the economic system,
just as they do not participate equally in the legal or health care
delivery systems. There are relatively few black-owned business enter-
prises, and such existing enterprises do not generate a significant
amount of business volume. As of 1976, for example, only 3% of the
13 million businesses in the United States were owned by blacks and
other minority persons, and of 2.54 trillion dollars in gross business re-
114. For a summary of the data, see M. SEHAM, BLACKS AND AMERICAN
MEDICAL CARE 9-11 (1973).
115. If so, a quota-type preferential admissions program presumably would be
found to be an appropriate means of advancing this interest.
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ceipts that year, only about 16.6 billion dollars, or 0.65% of the total,
were realized by minority-owned businesses. 1 6 The absence of blacks
in the top management of American corporations needs no documen-
tation. Blacks are disproportionately underrepresented in "white col-
lar" jobs, " 7 and even in the "blue collar" category, where the distribu-
tion of blacks and whites is more equal, blacks are disproportionately
concentrated in "laborer" jobs and are very underrepresented in
"crafts" jobs. " 8
The lack of the equal participation of blacks in the economic
system directly correlates with the condition of racial economic ine-
quality that exists in this nation. There is a substantial "income gap"
between blacks and whites," 9 a much higher incidence of unemploy-
ment and underemployment among blacks, 120 and a much higher pro-
portion of black families than white families living below the federally-
defined poverty level. 121
Racial preference in the economic area involves making structural
changes in the way that particular forms of economic activity operate
to increase black participation in those activities. In United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 122 last Term's "affirmative action" case,
the racial preference was directed toward increasing the representa-
tion of blacks in the skilled crafts. In Fullilove v. Klutznick,1 23 this
Term's "affirmative action" case, the preference was directed at
improving the position of minority business enterprises by giving them
a 10% share of public works projects financed by federal grants. 124
Since Weber dealt with a voluntary racial preference contained in an
in-service training program established pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and the union, the issue
was whether the program was violative of Title VII, and the Court
held that it was not. 125 In Fullilove, the constitutionality of the minor-
116. 122 CONG. REc. 13866 (1976) (statement of Senator Javits); 122 CONG.
REc. 34754 (1976) (statement of Senator Glenn).
117. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 138 nn.22-23.
118. Id. 138-39 nn.24-25. The exclusion of blacks from the crafts on racial
grounds has been so clearly demonstrated as to now be a subject of judicial notice.
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979).
119. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 139 nn.26-27.
120. Id. 138 nn.21-22.
121. Id. 139 n.26.
122. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
123. 48 U.S.L.W. 4979 (1980).
124. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. I1977). .125. The employer, under the collective bargaining agreement, was to establish
an in-plant training program for skilled craft workers. The trainees were to be drawn
from the employer's work-force, and half of the trainees were to be black. In effect,
separate racial seniority lists were established to determine eligibility for admission to
the program. The program was challenged by an excluded white worker who had
greater plant seniority than some of the included black workers. The employer and the
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ity business enterprise "set aside" was sustained by the Second Circuit
on the ground that it was designed to remedy past discrimination in
the awarding of governmental construction contracts,126 and the
remedying of past discrimination was the essential basis of the various
opinions upholding the "set aside" when the case reached the Supreme
Court. 127
I want to approach these cases from the perspective of the societal
interest in the equal participation of blacks in the economic system. In
order to bring Weber into the constitutional ambit, assume that the
federal government required the employer, as a federal contractor, to
adopt the program in order to be eligible to receive federal contracts. 128
As I have discussed elsewhere, the government, as a contractor, can
assert an interest in having the equal participation of racial minorities
in the "governmental market." 129 But leaving this aside, I want to
discuss the societal interest that is advanced by requiring that black
workers be brought into the skilled crafts and by giving black business
enterprises a share of governmental construction contracts.
These actions, as we have seen, represent an effort to make struc-
tural changes in the operation of particular forms of economic activity
to increase black participation in that activity. The ultimate objective
of such efforts is to alleviate the condition of racial economic inequal-
ity that exists in this nation, reflecting the lack of equal participation
of blacks in the economic system. The training of blacks as skilled
workers will contribute to increasing the income of blacks as a group.
Similarly, since experience indicates that black business enterprises are
likely to employ proportionately more blacks than are white business
union did not admit that there had been past discrimination against blacks in the
employer's workforce. The Court held that the program was not violative of Title VII
on the ground that Congress did not intend to prohibit "all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy [in
employment.]" United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204. It may be
noted that the result of the employer's "affirmative action" program here was to open
new opportunities for white workers in the plant as well as black workers, since prior to
the institution of the program, the employer had recruited all of its craft workers from
outside of the plant. Id. 198-99. As to gains to whites from programs initially instituted
for the benefit of blacks and from black efforts to achieve equality, see the discussion
in Bell, supra note 40, at 14-16.
126. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4979
(1980).
127. See note 139 infra.
128. See Exec. Order No. 11, 246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965) as amended by Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 1978 Comp. pp. 230-34. In Weber, the district court
found that one of the reasons motivating the adoption of the racially-preferential in-
plant training program was Kaiser's concern for meeting the "affirmative action" goal
it had established pursuant to E.O. 11246. Weber v. United Steelworkers of America,
415 F. Supp. 761, 764-65 (E.D. La. 1976), affd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
129. Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 160-62.
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enterprises,1 30 the continued survivability of these enterprises will
likewise increase the income of blacks as a group.' 3 ' In addition, the
increase in the number of black craft workers and viable black-owned
businesses may have the effect of reducing black unemployment and
underemployment. 132
The question, then, becomes whether the government can reason-
ably conclude that there is a societal interest in alleviating the condi-
tion of racial economic inequality that exists in this nation. Some guid-
ance in this regard can be obtained from the Court's decision in
Weber and from its decisions interpreting Title VII generally. These.
decisions indicate that when Congress enacted Title VII, it recognized
that there was a societal interest in blacks having a "fair share" of the
available jobs in an employer's workforce,1 33 so that in time there
might be an end to racial economic inequality, resulting in large part
from years of rampant racial discrimination in employment. As the
Court stated in Weber:
Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was with "the plight of the Negro in our economy.
Before 1964, blacks were largely relegated to "unskilled and
semi-skilled jobs." Because of automation the number of such
jobs was rapidly decreasing. As a consequence, "the relative
position of the Negro worker [was] steadily worsening. In 1947
the nonwhite unemployment rate was only 64 percent higher
than the white race; in 1962 it was 124 percent higher."[3 4]
Congress considered this a serious social problem ...
Congress feared that the goals of the Civil Rights Act - the
integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society
- could not be achieved unless this trend were reversed. And
Congress recognized that that would not be possible unless
blacks were able to secure jobs "which have a future." . . . Ac-
cordingly, it was clear to Congress that "[t]he crux of the prob-
lem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in oc-
cupations which have been traditionally closed to them," and it
130. Blacks are more likely to be aware of jobs that are available in black-owned
enterprises and are more likely to be hired by those enterprises.
131. There will also be a multiplier effect insofar as those enterprises deal with
other black enterprises as suppliers and/or customers.
132. As Senator Brooke observed: "[M]inority businesses' workforces are prin-
cipally drawn from residents of communities with severe and chronic unemployment....
Only with a healthy, vital minority business sector can we hope to make dramatic
strides in our fight against the massive and chronic unemployment which plagues
minority communities throughout this country." 123 CONG. REc. S. 3910 (Daily ed.
Mar. 10, 1977) (statement of Senator Brooke).
133. See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 148.
134. As of 1976, it was more than double. Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6,
at 138 n.21.
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was this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial
discrimination in employment was primarily addressed."
5
As the above discussion indicates, racial economic inequality, in all its
manifestations, is a "serious social problem," and "integration of
blacks into the mainstream of American society" cannot be achieved
until race is no longer associated with low-income status and until
there is no longer racial economic inequality in American life.
Racial economic inequality is perhaps the most enduring and per-
sistent consequence of the social history of racism, 136 and it can only
be ended by making structural changes in economic activity to
increase black participation in that activity and bring about equal
participation of blacks in the economic system.". 7 There is a strong
societal interest in ending the racial economic inequality that exists in
today's American society which should render constitutional govern-
mental efforts to bring about equal participation of blacks in the
economic system. 138
It is my submission, therefore, that there is a strong societal inter-
est in bringing about equal participation of blacks in a number of
important aspects of American life: the institutions of government, the
"power professions," and the economic system. The use of racial
preference to advance the equal participation objective, therefore,
advances a valid and substantial governmental interest and should be
held to be constitutional. 139
135. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 443 U.S. at 202-03 (citations
omitted).
136. Black family income, for example, has never exceeded 60% of white fami-
ly income, Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 6, at 139, and the other indicators of
economic inequality have likewise persisted over the years. See generally U.S. COMM.
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOCIAL INDICATORS OF EQUALTY FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN
(1978).
137. This point was emphasized in the debates over the minority business enter-
prise set aside. According to Representative Mitchell: "We cannot continue to hand
out survival programs for the poor in this country. We cannot continue that forever.
The only way we can put an end to that kind of a program is through building a viable
minority business system." 123 CONG. REC. H. 1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (state-
ment of Representative Mitchell). As Representative Biaggi concluded: "This amend-
ment will go a long way toward helping to achieve [economic] parity and more impor-
tantly to promote a sense of economic equality in this Nation." Id. (statement of
Representative Biaggi).
138. Because these efforts adversely impact upon the economic interests of in-
dividual whites, the courts will carefully scrutinize the appropriateness of the means
used. But the key to appropriateness is the reasonableness of the preference, and a
reasonable racial ratio, such as the 50-50 ratio involved in Weber, which is intended to
"eliminate a manifest racial imbalance," United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,
443 U.S. at 208, or the 10% set aside involved in Fullilove, clearly satisfies this test.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4889-90 (Burger, CJ.), 4997 (Powell, J.), 4999
(Marshall, J.).
139. Since Fullilove v. Klutznick, 48 U.S.L.W. 4979 (1980), was decided after
this article had gone to press, there was no opportunity to incorporate a discussion of the
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this writing, I have considered the constitutionality of racial
preference in light of the societal interest in the equal participation
objective. In the final analysis, the societal interest is an interest in
bringing about equal participation of blacks in all aspects of American
life, in getting the consequences of the social history of racism behind
us, once and for all, 140 in ending the existence of "two societies, black
case in the body of the article. By a vote of 6-3, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the 10% minority business enterprise "set aside." There was no majority opinion.
Chief Justice Burger wrote an opinion joined in by Justices White and Powell. Justice
Powell also wrote a separate opinion. Justice Marshall wrote an opinion, joined in by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented, and Justice Stevens dissented separately.
The remedying of past discrimination was the essential basis of the opinions
upholding the constitutionality of the "set aside." Chief Justice Burger saw the "set
aside" as representing the determination of Congress, acting pursuant to its spending
power and to its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, that grantees
of federal funds would not employ procurement practices that might result in
"perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or foreclosed
access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities." 48 U.S.L.W. at
4986. Justice Powell contended that deference had to be given to the conclusion of
Congress that "purposeful discrimination contributed significantly to the small per-
centage of federal contracting funds that minority business enterprises have received."
48 U.S.L.W. at 4995. Justice Marshall, while maintaining that his resolution of the
issue in Fullilove was governed by his separate opinion in Bakke, also emphasized that
"Congress had a sound basis for concluding that minority-owned construction enter-
prises, though capable, qualified, and ready and willing to work, have received a
disproportionately small amount of public contracting business because of the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination." 48 U.S.L.W. at 4999. Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist in dissent argued that the government could never require that public
works contracts be awarded on the basis of race. 48 U.S.L.W. at 5000-5001. Justice
Stevens, while not going quite that far, maintained that Congress had failed to
"demonstrate that its unique statutory preference is justified by a relevant
characteristic that is shared by the members of the preferred class." 48 U.S.L.W. at
5008.
Because of the majority's emphasis on remedying past discrimination, there was
no real consideration of the societal interest in the equal participation of blacks in the
economic system. Fullilove may indicate that for the foreseeable future, "affirmative
action" cases will be litigated (and "affirmative action" programs will be structured)
within the framework of "remedying past discrimination" rather than with reference
to the equal protection objective that has been the focus of this article.
140. As Justice Blackmun observed in Bakke: "In order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause (perpetrate racial supremacy." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
Professor Van Alstyne argues to the contrary:
Rather, one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete,
resolute, and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in
the life or practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other
human beings by race. Indeed, that is the great lesson for government itself
to teach: in all we do in life, whatever we may do in life, to treat any person
less well than another or to favor any more than another for being black or
1258 [Vol. 26
1980] RACIAL PREFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1259
and white, separate and unequal. ' 141 The use of racial preference to
achieve the equal participation objective, therefore, is in the societal
interest, and since it is in the societal interest, it is constitutional.
Whether viewed in terms of constitutional values, 1 42 or in terms of the
societal interest in the equal participation objective, the use of racial
preference to advance the equal participation objective is constitu-
tional because it is related to achieving "genuine equality" between
blacks and whites in American society.143
white or brown or red, is wrong. Let that be our fundamental law and we
shall have a Constitution universally worth expounding.
Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 809-10. Given the present consequences of the social
history of racism in this nation, however, Van Alstyne's view of a "Constitution univer-
sally worth expounding" would be a Constitution that reinforces white supremacy and
black inferiority. As has so frequently happened in American society, see Bell, supra
note 40, at 16, the costs of this "lofty" constitutional principle would be borne un-
mitigatedly by blacks, who for the remotely foreseeable future would be relegated to a
condition of societal inferiority and denied equal participation in American life. I do
not think that such a Constitution would be one "universally worth expounding."
141. See note 50 supra.
142. This was the approach that I took in my prior writings. See note 83 supra.
143. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 398 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
